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Accumulation of Knowledge in Para-Scientific Areas.  
The Case of Analytic Philosophy 
 
 
 
Eugenio Petrovich1 
 
Abstract: This study analyzes how the accumulation of knowledge takes place in para-scientific areas, 
focusing on the case of Analytic Philosophy. The theoretical framework chosen for the analysis is 
Kuhn’s theory of normal science. The methodology employed is qualitative citation context analysis. A 
sample of 60 papers published in leading Analytic Philosophy journals between 1950 and 2009 is 
analyzed, and a specific classificatory scheme is developed to classify citations according to their 
epistemological function. Compared to previous studies of citation context, this is the first paper that 
includes the temporal dimension into the analysis of citation context, in order to gain insights into the 
process of knowledge accumulation. Interestingly, the results show that Analytic Philosophy started 
accumulating after Second World War, but in a peculiar way. The accumulation was not matched by a 
corresponding rising consensus. This can be explained by the hypothesis that AP underwent a process 
of fragmentation in sub-fields during the second half of the century. 
Keywords: analytic philosophy; citation context analysis; Normal science; Kuhn; citation function; 
accumulation of knowledge 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the most striking features of science is the progressive accumulation of scientific contents in 
time. The stock of scientific knowledge available is indeed not fixed but continues to grow, and, 
especially in the Twentieth century, with an exponential pace (Price 1986). Even if the idea that science 
progresses in a linear and cumulative manner has been challenged since the landmark work of Thomas 
Kuhn by different philosophers, historians and sociologists of science, it is undeniable that scientific 
information grows. 2 And this growth is surely one of the components of the very idea of “scientific 
                                                          
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Milan. Via Festa del Perdono 7, 20122 Milan (Italy)  
2 In this study, no explicit definition of the term “knowledge” will be provided, since any definition is bound to raise 
difficult epistemological and, more broadly, philosophical problems. However, this study inscribes itself within an approach 
to knowledge that can be termed “anti-representationalism” (Hacking 1979). Anti-representationalism is rooted in Kant and 
Hegel’s philosophy of knowledge and at least some of its features have been embraced in the Twentieth century by Popper, 
Lakatos, Kuhn, and Foucault (see Popper 1979, Lakatos 1978, Kuhn 1970 and Foucault 2002). Anti-representationalism 
considers knowledge as the product of the activity of the knowing subject (be it the individual or a collective entity such as the 
scientific community), not as a “true representation” of the “world out there” or as a set of “justified true beliefs” held by 
knowing subjects. According to anti-representationalism, the primary feature of knowledge is its being a (human) product. 
As a product, knowledge constitutes a “third world” (different from both the “first world”, the physical reality, and the 
“second world”, the mental reality) that is materially embodied in books, archives, databases and scientific papers (Popper 
1979 : ch. 3). From this point of view, saying that scientific knowledge grows is the same as saying that scientific literature 
grows. A full justification of anti-representationalism lies outside the scope of this paper. However, the main motivations for 
adopting it as a theoretical background are the following. First, it allows to avoid vast philosophical debates about truth and 
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progress” (Hacking 1979). Kuhn himself recognized such dimension, identifying it within what he 
called “normal science” (i.e. the science practiced between scientific revolutions, see Kuhn 1970). 
If the process of accumulation taking place in scientific disciplines is widely studied by sociologists of 
science and scientometricians, the way in which information accumulates and knowledge grows in non-
scientific areas is less known. However, it is important to study such cases, as they shed light on 
similarities and differences in the way sciences and humanities produce knowledge. In this regard, 
philosophy is an extremely interesting case-study. Philosophy is a venerable discipline, with a two-
thousand-year-old history. Even if today it is usually classified as a humanistic field, it shares with 
science the interest for developing theories in a rational and rigorous way. In particular, contemporary 
Analytic Philosophy seems to be attracted by a scientific model of inquiry, mimicking several features 
of contemporary science in its research practices and self-image.   
This study focuses on Analytic Philosophy as a case-study of para-science and uses citation analysis to 
investigate how knowledge accumulates within it. The aim is to assess if and how the pattern of 
accumulation taking place in Analytic Philosophy has become analogous to the one sciences display.  
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, in the remainder of the Introduction, Analytic Philosophy is 
presented in detail and its alleged similarities with science are discussed. Secondly, a definite research 
question is pointed out in light of the Kuhnian theory of normal science. Thirdly, the general method 
which was designed to address the research question (qualitative citation context analysis) is introduced, 
and related literature is reviewed. The following section (Methodology) describes in detail how the 
citation context analysis was performed, highlighting the features of the sample, the considered time 
frames, and the classificatory scheme designed to label citations. In the Result section, the main 
empirical results of the analysis are presented, and in the Discussion section, they are discussed in light 
of the research question and the wider theoretical framework under investigation (i.e. the accumulation 
process of Analytic Philosophy and science). Lastly, in the Conclusions section, the most important 
findings are highlighted, and further lines of research are suggested.  
1.1 PRESENTATION OF THE CASE-STUDY 
Since the Second World War, Analytic Philosophy (hereafter AP) developed into the dominant 
philosophical tradition of the English-speaking world (UK, US, and Australia) and Scandinavian 
countries (Searle 1996). In the last two decades, it has attracted increasing attention also in Continental 
Europe, as indicated by the establishment of several societies of analytic philosophers all over Europe 
(Beaney 2013). Today, AP is one of the main traditions of twentieth-century Western philosophy, 
together with the “Continental Philosophy”. The scission between these two traditions (the so-called 
“Analytic-Continental divide”) is a key feature of the contemporary philosophical landscape. Even if 
both sides have made several attempts to bridge the gap, the split remains a clear sociological fact of 
contemporary philosophy (Levy 2003, Glock 2008).  
However, from a historiographical point of view neither analytic philosophers nor historians of 
philosophy reached a consensus on a proper definition of Analytic Philosophy or, for that matters, 
Continental Philosophy. Glock (2008) reviews and carefully criticizes all the proposals made in the 
literature to assess distinctive features of AP, ranging from geo-linguistic definitions (AP as Anglo-
                                                                                                                                                                                                
the definition of knowledge as “justified true belief” (an introduction to them can be found in Moran 2010 : ch. 11). Second,  
it allows to focus on the phenomenon of accumulation of knowledge without raising the problem of the advancement 
towards the “truth” (see Bird 2007 for a recent discussion of the relationship between scientific progress and truth), that is 
particularly difficult in the case of philosophical knowledge. Finally, it allows to inquire the activity of accumulation of 
knowledge and track its changes over time, without assuming a teleological drive such as “truth” in the history of knowledge 
(Kuhn 1970 : ch. 3 and Bloor 1991). 
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American philosophy) to doctrinal and topic criteria (lack of historical awareness, a special concern 
with language, the scarce attention for ethical and political issues), to more refined approaches, that 
focused on stylistic and methodological definitions (e.g. clarity in the philosophical argumentation, the 
method of analysis) 
Glock concludes that none of the proposed criteria is immune to counter-examples. Thus, he advances 
the idea that what binds AP together is a Wittgensteinian “family resemblance”, i.e. a thread of 
overlapping similarities (doctrinal, methodological and stylistic), along with a common historical origin, 
traceable back to the works of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, logical positivism, Willard V.O. Quine, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Oxford ordinary language philosophy (J. L. Austin, G. Ryle etc.).  
1.2 A HYPOTHESIS ABOUT AP 
Recently, both philosophers and historians of philosophy suggested the hypothesis that AP could be 
seen as a para-science, namely as an area of philosophy that underwent, during the twentieth century, a 
process of progressive approaching to the methods, the ethos and the self-image of the sciences.  
Levy (2003) explicitly suggests that the research practice of AP can be successfully understood when 
compared to the Kuhnian normal science. He proposes to characterize AP as “philosophical research 
conducted under a paradigm”:  
My suggestion is this: AP has successfully modeled itself on the physical sciences. Work in it is 
thus guided by paradigms that function in the way Kuhn sketches, and the discipline is 
reproduced in something akin to the way in which the sciences are reproduced. (Levy 2003 : 
291)  
Richardson (2008) notes that the adoption of a “scientific ethos” in philosophy, somehow resembling 
the Mertonian normative model of science (Merton 1973), was actively promoted by logical positivists 
(one of the roots of contemporary AP) already in the 1930s. Logical positivists advocated a piecemeal 
and collaborative style of work in philosophy and even created the word “philosophical research” on 
the model of “scientific research” (Reichenbach 1978, quoted in Richardson 2008). 
Marconi (2014) and Putnam (1997), respectively leading analytic philosophers in Italy and in the USA, 
claim that the “the self-image of analytic philosophy is scientific rather than humanistic” (Putnam 1997 
: 201), and that analytic philosophers today conceive AP as a collective enterprise pursued by highly 
specialized “professionals” (Marconi 2014), working in accordance with the best scientific practices 
(such as peer-review, publication in specialized journals, use of technical language, a high division of 
cognitive labor, and so on).  
1.3 AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The aim of this study is to empirically assess the claim that AP has undergone a process of approaching 
a scientific style of intellectual production. Specifically, this study will test the hypothesis, advanced by 
Levy (2003), that AP has undergone a process of “normalization”, i.e. an assimilation to the Kuhnian 
normal science model.  
In order to translate this general aim into a definite research question, it is essential to highlight what 
features of Kuhn’s theory of normal science are taken into consideration for the purpose of this study. 
As it is well known, Kuhn (1970) closely tied the notion of normal science to the one of paradigm or, 
later, to what he called a “disciplinary matrix” (i.e. the set of symbolic generalization, metaphysical 
commitments, validation standards and scientific exemplars shared by a discipline). However, the 
notion of normal science in Kuhn (1970) is introduced as the stage following either the pre-
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paradigmatic proto-science or the revolutionary science, which is practiced during scientific revolutions. 
In this respect, what distinguishes normal science from the other stages is the fact that only in normal 
science periods scientific knowledge accumulates, i.e. develops in the classic cumulative way we usually 
attribute to sciences. During pre-paradigmatic or revolutionary science, scientific knowledge is instead 
unstable and continuously contested. From a sociological point of view, it can be said that in periods of 
normal science the consensus within the scientific community is high, whereas in pre-paradigmatic or 
revolutionary science the consensus is low, and the scientific community is fragmented in competing, 
incompatible schools (Cole 1992).  
In the present study, we focus on the cumulative nature of normal science. Thus, we aim to answer the 
following research question:  
Has AP started to accumulate during the second half of the twentieth century?  
It is important to untangle the notion of accumulation from the close, albeit different, notion of progress 
towards the truth. The accumulation is a process that concerns the growth of the available stock of 
knowledge, and it is a property of the knowledge itself. The epistemological question about the relation 
between the stock of knowledge and the “world out there”, i.e. the question of the progress towards 
the truth, is a different issue, which is not addressed in the present study. 3 
1.4 CITATIONS AS AN “OPEN WINDOW” ON THE PROCESS OF ACCUMULATION 
The method chosen to answer the research question is citation context analysis. To justify this choice, first, 
it will be explained why citation analysis was carried out, and second, why the context of citation was 
also taken into account. 
It is well known that citations, both in sciences and in humanities, represent links among documents. 
These links incorporate a diachronic information: citations go (usually) from newer documents to older 
documents. 4 Citations are therefore one of the ways in which an author relates her own contribution to 
the existing stock of knowledge (Hyland 1999). In both sciences and humanities, this stock of 
knowledge, i.e. the disciplinary body, is often referred to as the “literature” of the field. In certain 
disciplines, the cited literature is confined to the very recent “research front” (Price 1970), whereas in 
others it may go back many years, sometimes even centuries (e.g. in Continental Philosophy, it is not 
unusual to cite Aristotle for theoretical purposes, treating him as a “contemporary” philosopher). 
Hence, citations are an open window on the process of accumulation, which is the focus of this study. 
Clearly, citations provide an incomplete perspective on the way in which knowledge accumulates. For 
instance, the phenomenon of OBI (obliteration by inclusion) pointed out by Merton (1988) is a case in 
which a certain piece of knowledge is incorporated into the disciplinary body without the use of explicit 
citation. However, citations are probably the most apparent and the most empirically accessible trace of 
the accumulation process. This is the reason why citation analysis was chosen as the method for the 
present research.  
The links the citing document establishes with the cited documents (i.e. the citations) can be further 
characterized taking into account the context in which the citation appears, i.e. the portion of text that 
surrounds the citation. This approach to the study of citations is known as citation context analysis (Small 
1982, Bornmann and Daniel 2008). Citation context analysis seems particularly suitable to clarify the 
                                                          
3 Kuhn was very clear in distinguishing the accumulation process taking place in the normal science periods from the 
metaphysical notion of progress, conceived as a movement of approach to the truth. Indeed, he was quite wary  about the 
very idea that science progresses towards the “truth”, because this seems to imply a teleological drive in the development of 
science – a claim that is difficult to test empirically (See Kuhn 1970: ch. 13 and Bloor 1991). 
4 Rarely, citations point out also to the “future”, in the case of references to “forthcoming” publications. 
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fine-grained structure of the knowledge accumulation process since it allows to characterize the 
relationship between the citing and the cited text and consider the epistemic relations among documents 
(e.g. criticism, support, acknowledgement, etc.). 
Citation context analysis has been performed either quantitatively or qualitatively. The quantitative 
approach (which is the most recent one) carries out the analysis of the context of citation by using 
natural language processing techniques that are trained based on an annotated corpus (e.g. Valenzuela 
et al. 2015, Bertin et al. 2016, Sula and Miller 2014, Catalini et al. 2015, Teufel et al. 2006). On the other 
hand, the qualitative approach adopts a classic close reading method, and experts are required to read 
and characterize the whole sentence (or even the whole paper) incorporating citations. In this study, the 
qualitative approach was chosen to carry out the citation context analysis. According to the excellent 
review by Bornmann and Daniel (2008), qualitative citation context studies can be divided in two 
families: a) studies focusing on the functions that citations play in the citing document (supporting 
claims, overviewing the field, etc.); and b) studies focusing on how a set of documents (e.g. the works 
by funding figures of a disciplines) is cited in the following literature.  
Since this study belongs to the first family, the most relevant literature in this strand of research will be 
briefly reviewed. Moravcsick and Murugesan (1975) investigated citations in 30 articles in theoretical 
high energy physics and devised a classificatory scheme that considered five functions of the citations. 
The first (conceptual versus operational citations) and the third function (evolutionary vs. 
juxtapositional citations) were meant to provide insight into the type of connectedness of scientific 
communication, whereas the second (organic versus perfunctory) and the fourth dimension 
(confirmative versus negational citations) addressed directly the quality of the citations. The fifth 
dimension (valuable versus redundant) was related to the importance of the cited work for the citing 
work. The study of Moravcsick and Murugesan aimed to assess the use of citation scores as measures 
of scientific quality. According to the authors, the high percentage of perfunctory citations found in the 
papers (41%) casts “serious doubts” about the use of citations as an indication of quality. Chubin and 
Moitra (1975) followed up on Moravcsick and Murugesan’s work and also studied citations in physics. 
They examined citations in letters and articles in major physics journals and devised a classificatory 
scheme which focused on defining citations as either affirmative or negative. They found that citations 
made by physicists were most frequently affirmative citations, whereas negational citations represented 
only a small fraction. The finding that scientists in general tend to avoid negative citations was 
corroborated by further studies (Catalini et al. 2015, Bertin et al. 2016, Cano 1989). Spiegel-Rösing 
(1977) is the first study of citation context outside the field of physics. Spiegel-Rösing examined 
citations in the first four volumes of the journal Science Studies and found that the most frequent 
function of references is to substantiate a statement made in the citing text or point out to further 
information. In fact, supportive citations represent 80% of the total. Frost (1979) is the first study to 
investigate the function of citations in a humanities area, i.e. German literary research. Frost discusses 
the differences as well as the similarities in the citation usage of sciences and humanities, highlighting 
the fact that in the humanities there is a clear difference between references pointing to primary 
literature and references to secondary literature (i.e. research produced by other scholars, see also 
Hellqvist 2009). The classificatory scheme developed by Frost will be discussed in paragraph 2.3, when 
the scheme used in this study will be presented. Finally, Peritz (1983) proposed a general scheme to 
classify citation roles (designed mainly for social sciences), which includes the following 8 categories of 
citations: setting the stage citations, citations providing background information, methodological, 
comparative, speculative, documentary, historical, and casual citations. 
In the 1980s, researchers began to shift their focus to the study of how some specific document or set 
of documents was used by the following literature that cited it (see e.g. Oppenheim and Renn 1978, 
Hooten 1991). At the same time, new methodologies were used to investigate the citation behavior of 
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researchers, most notably surveys and interviews (see sections 2.4 of Bornmann and Daniel 2008 for a 
review of these studies). In the last decade, quantitative approaches to citation context analysis, aiming 
to automatically recognize citations functions and quality, have considerably flourished (see Hernãndez-
Alvarez and Gomez (2016) for a recent overview of the state of the art).  
In scientometric and sociological literature, citation context analysis is sometimes used as an empirical 
tool to assess the main competing theories of citations, i.e. the normative theory inspired by Merton 
(e.g. Kaplan 1965) versus the socio-constructivist approach (e.g. Gilbert 1977) rooted in the social 
constructivist sociology of science. The idea is to test the predictions about citation behavior made by 
the two theories and check if they match real citation practices, as they emerge from the citation 
context. However, the focus of the present study is slightly different. The primary interest is not to test 
citation theories against the citation behavior of analytic philosophers, but to use citation context 
analysis to unveil the pattern of accumulation of knowledge in AP. Thus, the purpose of this study is 
more epistemological than sociological, in so far as it focuses primarily on an epistemological topic (the 
process of knowledge accumulation), rather than on the sociology of citation practices within an 
epistemic community.5 
1.5 CITATION ANALYSIS OF PHILOSOPHY 
To conclude the review of the literature, it is worth mentioning previous studies that investigated 
philosophy via diverse scientometric and citation analysis techniques.  
Cullars (1998), Hyland (1999) and Sula and Miller (2014) are the closest to the present research. The 
first study examined 539 references from 183 English-language philosophy monographs published in 
1984. Several characteristics of the citations were analyzed, including the language of the cited 
document, the gender of both citing and cited authors, the citing author’s attitude towards the cited 
material, and the subject correlation between citing and cited documents. The author concluded that 
citation patterns in philosophy are typically humanistic, with the bulk of citations pointing to books 
rather than journal articles. Hyland (1999) explored the ways in which academic citation practices 
contribute to the construction of disciplinary knowledge. The author analyzed a multi-disciplinary 
corpus of 80 research articles from different disciplines (including philosophy) and interviewed 
experienced researchers about their citation practices. Hyland concluded that philosophy, in line with 
other soft disciplines such as marketing and sociology, employed more citations than hard-science 
disciplines such as physics and engineering. However, the author suggests that citation in philosophy 
plays a different role to the one it plays in the hard sciences: citations are not primarily used to extend 
the thread of knowledge but to position the writer in relation to views that the author supports or 
opposes. This is clear also from the choice of report verbs used by philosophers to introduce the 
citation: contrary to the sciences, where neutral report verbs (such as “present” and “report”) are 
common, in philosophy evaluative report verbs (such as “overlook”, “exaggerate”), that flag agreement 
or disagreement with the cited reference, are the most frequently used. Finally, Sula and Miller (2014) 
used sentiment analysis to automatically classify citations in four different humanistic journals 
(including The Journal of Philosophy) and discovered that philosophy showed the most negative polarity, 
i.e. philosophers frequently dissociate from cited documents, providing critical commentaries on others’ 
work.  
Other studies do not address philosophy in general but focus on specific sub-disciplines or 
philosophical topics. Kreuzman (2011), Wray (2010), Wray and Bornmann (2015), and Byron (2007) 
addressed philosophy of science. Kreuzman (2011) used co-citation analysis techniques to map the 
interaction between epistemology and philosophy of science. Byron (2007) focused on philosophy of 
                                                          
5 Clearly, this does not exclude the possibility that this research could be of interest for sociologists of science. 
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biology, using bibliometric data to assess the traditional historical account of the emergence of this sub-
discipline in philosophy of science. Brad Wray (2010) determined the key journals of philosophy of 
science by counting how many times those journals are cited in leading philosophy of science 
companions. Brad Wray (2015) used an advanced bibliometric method (RPYS, Referenced Publication 
Year Spectroscopy) to identify peaks in citations in philosophy of science.  
Ahlgren et al. (2015) used various science mapping techniques (co-citation analysis and co-occurrence 
of terms) to map topical subdomains in philosophy (free will and sorites debates). Analytic philosophy as 
a field was specifically addressed in Buonomo and Petrovich (2018). In this study, a set of 4966 papers 
published in top analytic philosophy journals was analyzed with VOSviewer (Van Eck and Waltman 
2010). Lists of most cited authors were extracted and the process of specialization of AP was mapped 
by co-citation mapping. Specialization in philosophy (not only analytic) was the subject also of Wray 
(2014), who examined the degree of specialization in various sub-fields of philosophy, starting from 
data obtained from surveying professional philosophers.   
Finally, it is worth mentioning Cronin et al. (2003), who chronicled the use of acknowledgements in 
Twentieth-century philosophy and psychology. They demonstrated how acknowledgement has 
gradually established itself as a constitutive element of academic writing, and how it can be used to 
reveal “subautorship” forms of collaboration.  
2 METHODOLOGY 
2.1 FROM INTELLECTUAL CONTENT TO PUBLICATIONS 
The first step of this study was to translate the vague and debated notion of AP into a relevant set of 
publications upon which citation context analysis could be conducted. In order to avoid the 
historiographical issues mentioned in the Introduction section, it was decided to consider AP as a 
research specialty inside the wider discipline of philosophy. A research specialty can be defined as a 
self-organized network of researchers who tend to study the same research topics, attend the 
same conferences, read and cite each other’s research papers and publish in the same research 
journals. (Morris et Van der Veer Martens 2008 : 214-215) 
Defining AP as a research specialty clearly does not solve the historiographical problems stated above, 
but it allows to “operationalize” the vague notion of AP, and climb down from the level of the 
intellectual content to the level of the publications, which are the outcome of the intellectual activity. In 
this way, AP can be translated into a set of publications, following a familiar epistemological move of 
scientometric research (i.e. the reduction of the intellectual content of science to the public form of its 
outcome, namely publications, see Wouters 1999).  
Papers in specialized journals were selected as the publication type to study, whereas books were not 
taken into account. This is mainly because of two reasons. First, there is already a study concerning 
citation context in philosophy monographs (Cullars 1998). Even if it does not focus on AP but on 
philosophy in general, it was chosen not to replicate this study but to focus on the journal literature (as 
Cullars himself suggests in the final section of the paper). Second, AP opts for journal articles rather 
than books as key outlets for disseminating research (Levy 2003, Alghren et al. 2015). 6  
Five journals were selected as representative of AP: The Philosophical Review, Noûs, The Journal of 
Philosophy, Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. These journals are all considered highly 
                                                          
6 This is another feature of AP that suggests an approaching to the normal science style of intellectual production. 
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prestigious in the AP community. They were ranked the “top five” journals in a recent survey 7 
conducted by the blog Leiter Reports: A Philosophy Blog, a popular blog among analytic philosophers. 
Furthermore, they are considered “generalist” journals, hence they are a good representation of the 
whole AP field. 8 
2.2 THE TIME-WINDOW AND THE SAMPLE 
Since the research question studied in this paper is historical in nature, a wide time-window was chosen: 
from 1950 to 2009. Covering the last 60 years after the Second World War, this time-window allowed 
to detect the changes in the citation behavior of analytic philosophers, disclosing the patterns of the 
accumulation process.  
The 60-year time-window was further divided into six 10-year timespans. For each of the six timespans, 
the list of the most cited papers, published in the selected journals in that decade, was obtained from 
Web of Science. 9 Then, for each of the six timespans, the 10 most cited papers were chosen, and their 
full-texts downloaded. The result was a sample of 60 papers, divided into six groups of 10 papers 
each.10 Taken together, the total number of cited references in the sample amounted to 1293 references. 
It is important to stress that this is the first study that considers the temporal dimension in the analysis of 
the citation context. In fact, previous studies (Moravcsik and Murugesan 1975, Chubin and Moitra 
1975, Spiegel-Rösing 1977, Frost 1979, Bertin et al. 2016, Sula and Miller 2014, Catalini et al. 2015, 
Teufel et al. 2006) focused on disciplines whose citation practices were assumed to be rather “stable” in 
time, therefore no temporal dimension was considered. In the case of AP, however, it would be wrong 
not to take into consideration the temporal dimension. On the one hand, historians of philosophy agree 
on an evolution of AP in the last century: AP started from a small group of philosophical schools 
located in Vienna, Cambridge, Oxford, and a few American universities, and later on became a 
worldwide enterprise with thousands of practitioners (Kuklick 2001, Beaney 2013, Marconi 2014). It is 
unlikely that the citation behavior remained unchanged during this evolution. On the other hand, the 
accumulation of knowledge, as well as the approaching to Normal science, is structurally a process, i.e. 
something developing in time, not a state, i.e. something occurring in a definite moment. Therefore, it 
can be successfully detected only if the temporal dimension is included in the analysis. 
Instead of a random sample, the top ten most cited papers for each decade were selected for the 
following reasons. First, the high citation score of these papers means that they were widely read (i.e. 
they had a great impact on the AP community). Second, many “classics” of AP do appear in the 
sample, confirming that the selected papers are a good representation of “high-quality” AP in each 
decade, as analytic philosophers asked to assess the list confirmed. Being the publications both widely 
cited and high quality, it may be argued that they play the role of Kuhnian paradigms in the AP 
community, setting, to a certain extent, standards of citation behavior. 11 Third, the choice of a random 
set of papers would have implied a sample of at least 100 papers for each decade, in order to obtain 
statistically significant results. The analysis of such a large number of papers, however, was practically 
impossible because of the close reading approach chosen for this study (see above). 
                                                          
7 http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2015/09/the-top-20-general-philosophy-journals-2015.html   
8 Buonomo and Petrovich (2018) discuss in detail how to select journals representative of mainstream and “high-quality” 
research in AP 
9 Search date: 29.08.2017 
10 Two papers originally ranked top ten were excluded and substituted with subsequent papers in the ranking: [Anderson 
1958] and [Sen 1985]. Even if they were published in philosophy journals, their subject falls outside AP (even in the broad 
sense), being respectively a result in formal logic for the first and economic welfare theory for the second. 
11  See Chen (2013 : ch. 6) for some arguments in favor of the assimilation of high-impact publications to Kuhnian 
paradigms. 
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2.3 THE CLASSIFICATORY SCHEME 
Once the sample was chosen, the next step was developing a classificatory scheme to classify the citations. 
Classificatory schemes previously proposed in the literature were not suitable to address the 
epistemological focus of this study or the intellectual features of a philosophical specialty like AP. With 
regard to the first point, studies such as Moravcsik and Murugesan (1975) and Chubin and Moitra 
(1975) aimed to test sociological theories of citations and developed classificatory schemes suited to 
that purpose. As regards the second point, classificatory schemes should be adapted to the epistemic 
practices of the discipline under study. For example, in the sciences there are citations whose function 
is to identify specific laboratory techniques or equipment (Garfield 1962). This does not occur in AP, 
where no laboratory activities are involved. The classificatory scheme should take into account such 
differences.   
The classificatory scheme used in this study is summarized in Tab. 1. Six categories were defined (plus a 
seventh “Unknown” category designed to collect citations that did not fall in any of the categories). All 
the categories were designed to capture different aspects of the phenomenon of accumulation. In the 
Appendix 2 examples of each category are provided. 
The category of “State of the art citations” captures citations that are employed to provide an overview 
of the field to which the citing paper intends to contribute. From an epistemological point of view, they 
point out the presence of a shared body of literature. The authors use such body as a knowledge base to 
articulate their own contribution around. In a mature field, the lack of such citations may result in the 
rejection of the paper, because the author did not sufficiently review the state of the art. The authors’ 
attitude towards this kind of citations is “neutral”: they neither endorse nor criticize them. The authors 
rather use the “State of the art citation” to locate their contribution in a specific stream of philosophical 
debates. The presence of these citations in AP is particularly interesting since they demonstrate that the 
AP research itself is divided into specific sub-contexts.  
The “Supporting citations” category gathers the citations that support the argument proposed in the 
citing paper, either by supplying arguments for certain claims or by reinforcing the author’s argument 
by showing that the cited reference agrees with it. From an epistemological point of view, they 
underline a constructive operation: knowledge is accumulated via a positive relation of agreement between 
the citing and the cited document.  
The third category, “Supplementary/perfunctory citations”, refers to citations that seem not to be 
essential to follow the author’s main argument. 12  On the other hand, the fourth category, 
“Acknowledgement citations”, is meant to capture citations that are explicitly used to pay homage to or 
acknowledge the cited author. 13 It may be argued that these categories are more sociological than 
epistemological, and thus not fitting the epistemological purpose of this study. However, it is important 
to emphasize that, even if these citations have no clear epistemological functions, they do provide 
negative or indirect epistemological information. If Supplementary/perfunctory citations were the most 
common type, it would mean that AP’s accumulation process is only loosely connected with 
epistemological factors. Alternatively, if Acknowledgement citations resulted to be the most common 
type (perhaps a more plausible scenario), it could be argued that the AP’s accumulation process is 
mainly based on social relations rather than epistemic. Both scenarios would offer important 
epistemological, although negative, insights into the accumulation process of AP: they would support the 
                                                          
12 The further question about the reasons an author may have to cite supplementary material (e.g. hidden social-networking 
purposes) is not pursued in this study. 
13 In this study, only explicit citations were considered, i.e. citations pointing to specific documents. Proto-citations such as 
“I owe this point to Prof. X”, commonly used in acknowledgements section of recent papers, are not counted. For an 
interesting study of acknowledgements in philosophy, see the mentioned study conducted by Cronin et al. (2003). 
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idea that AP accumulates in a “non-epistemic” manner. This would prompt further research in the 
social structure of AP. Hence, the more sociological categories, namely “Supplementary/perfunctory 
citation” and “Acknowledgement citations”, were included in the present study.  
In the “Critical citations” category, the cited reference is criticized by the author, who marks her 
disagreement with the cited reference. In the sciences, this type of citation is quite uncommon (Catalini 
et al. 2015, Bertin et al. 2016, Cano 1989), but in AP it is reasonable to expect a significant number of 
these citations, because of the high value of dialectics in philosophy in general (Cullars 1998). From an 
epistemological point of view, a critical citation is a destructive operation: its function is to undermine a 
previous piece of knowledge. From a sociological point of view, it flags lack of consensus on a topic. 
Finally, the last category, “Documental citation”, covers citations to documents used as historical 
sources. The cited text is mentioned as a support for the historical reconstruction provided in the citing 
paper. This kind of citation is very common in humanities, where there is a clear distinction between 
citations pointing to the textual material (e.g. historical documents in history) and citations pointing to 
other scholars (Hellqvist 2009, Frost 1979). In a theoretical discipline like AP, the number of historical 
citations is expected to be quite low. 
Frost (1979) proposes a classificatory scheme that partially aligns with the one used in the present 
study. Frost’s first group of citations (type A, documentation of primary sources) corresponds with 
what here is called Documental citations; her second group (type B.1, «references to previous 
scholarship […] independent of approval or disapproval of the citing author», 406) matches the State of 
the art citations, and her third (B.2) and fourth (B.3) groups can be compared with the Supporting and 
Critical citations, respectively. However, the scheme here proposed differs from Frost’s one as it 
includes categories that aim to detect also sociological aspects of the citation behavior, i.e. the 
categories Supplementary/perfunctory citations and Acknowledgement citations, that she did not 
consider.  
# Type  Function 
1 State of the art citation The reference is used to provide an overview of the state of 
the art of the field. It is «neutral»: the citing author does not 
use it either to support her argument or to criticize the cited 
document. It includes citations to standard mental 
experiments or examples. 
2 Supporting citation The reference supports the argument of the citing author, 
either because it brings additional arguments to the stated 
claims or because it strengthens the author’s arguments since 
the authors agree on specific topics.  
3 Supplementary/perfunctory 
citation 
The reference to the cited document is accidental. The cited 
work it is not essential to follow or support the citing 
author’s argument. 
4 Acknowledgment citation The citing author pays a form of tribute or acknowledgement 
towards the cited document. 
5 Critical citation The cited document is criticized, the citing author disagrees 
with the cited document. 
6 Documental citation The cited document is used to support the historical 
reconstruction of the argument of the cited author provided 
by the citing author. 
7 Unknown The citation does not fit into any of the previous categories. 
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Table 1 Classificatory scheme 
2.4 THE DECADE PROFILES 
Each paper was read entirely, and every cited reference was assigned to one or more categories, often in 
light of the entire content of the paper. 
When a reference was assigned to more than one category, its score was fractionalized in order to avoid 
percentages higher than 100% in the final sum.14  The score of each reference was not weighted: 
documents that were mentioned multiple times in the citing paper did not receive a score proportional 
to the number of mentions. Equally, the score of documents which were cited both positively and 
critically was not fractionalized proportionally to the number of times in which they were cited either 
positively or critically.15 The use of a system of weights, even if theoretically desirable, is actually 
unmanageable in practice. In fact, if adopted, it would have raised exegetical issues on each of the 
analyzed references, and it would have been ultimately highly subjective and not reproducible.   
The results of the analysis of each paper were summarized in a paper profile, reporting for each 
category both the absolute score and the percentage on the total. Then, the profiles of the papers of the 
same timespan were aggregated to obtain a single profile for each of the six decades.  
3 RESULTS 
3.1 AGGREGATED LEVEL (1950-2009) 
The results of the citation context analysis for the whole period (1950-2009) are summarized in Tab. 2. 
Data show that the Supporting citation is the most common type of citation (37.9%), followed by 
Critical citations (23.1%) and State of the art citations (21.4%). These three categories alone cover 
82.4% of the citations. Supplementary, Acknowledgement and Documental citations play only a minor 
role on the total (overall, they account only for 11.4% of the citations).  
Rank Type  Percentage on the total 
1 Supporting citations 37.9% 
2 Critical citations 23.1% 
3 State of the art citations 21.4% 
4 Supplementary/perfunctory 
citations 
4.7% 
5 Acknowledgment citations 3.4% 
6 Documental citations 3.4% 
7 Unknown 1.1% 
 TOTAL (3 papers with no 
citatations)16 
95.0% 
Table 2 Types of citation (1950-2009)  
However, the data show a great variance in time, as the next section highlights and explains in detail.  
                                                          
14 It turned out that no citation could be attributed to more than three categories. 
15 For example, if a reference was mentioned 3 times in the same article, but it played always the same function, it scored 1 
point, and not 3 points. On the other hand, if it was mentioned 3 times, each time with a different function, its point was 
equally divided among the functions it played. 
16 3 papers (1 in the decade 1950-1959 and 2 in the decade 1960-1969, 5% on the total) had no citations, so that the total is 
slightly lower than 100%. 
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3.2 DEVELOPMENT IN TIME  
The first clear pattern is the increase in the average number of references per paper (Fig.1), which 
shows a five-fold increase from the 1950s (8.8 citations per paper) to 2000s (44.1 citations per paper). 
The increase between the 1980s and 1990s is particularly evident. Moreover, only in the first two 
decades, we find papers without citations (1 in the 1950s and 2 in the 1960s). 
 
Fig. 1 Average number of references per paper over time 
Fig. 2 shows the average number of Supporting, Critical and State of the Art citations per paper in each 
decade. These three categories account for most of the citations in all the six timespans, and they all 
increase in time. This was expected, given the increase in the average number of reference shown in 
Fig.1. However, their increase rate is significantly different: State of the Art citations raise almost 
exponentially (increasing 13-folds, from 1.5 to 20.1 from the 1950s to 2000s), whereas Supporting 
citations increase quite linearly (from 4.0 to 13.4), and Critical citations slightly increase at first (from 
1.5 to 4.4), but then even seem to decrease in the last decade. 
Fig. 2 Average number of State of the art, Supporting and Critical citations per paper over time 
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In order to better understand how the relative weight of each category changes over time, we have 
considered the percentage of each citations category on the total. 
Fig. 3, 4 and 5 show the distribution of Supporting, Critical and State of the Art citations in time by box 
plot diagrams. Again, these three categories account for most of the citations in all the six timespans. 
 
Fig. 3 Percentage of Supporting citations over time (distribution over time). “×” = mean, “▬” = 
median, “o” = outlier. 
 
Fig. 4 Percentage of Critical citations over time (distribution over time) 
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Fig. 5 State of the art citations (distribution over time) 
Fig. 6, 7 and 8 show the trend of mean and median for each of the three categories. Both mean and 
median are shown because of the non-normal distribution of the citations. 
 
Fig. 6 Percentage of Supporting citations (Mean and Median over time) 
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Fig. 7 Percentage of Critical citations (Mean and Median over time) 
 
Fig. 8 Percentage of State of the art citations (Mean and Median over time) 
The percentage of State of the art citations clearly increases, especially in the last three decades. Their 
average triplicates from the 1950s to 2000s. The increase in the median values is even more evident 
(from 2.1% to 40.8%). From 1990 their minimum leaves the 0, becoming 2.9% in 1990s and 21.9% in 
2000s. Furthermore, in the last decade, this category has become the most common type of citation, 
overtaking the Supporting citations.  
Critical citations show an almost linear decreasing trend since the 1970s, with their mean decreasing 
from 30.7% in 1950s to 10.4% in 2010s. On the other hand, the trend of Supporting citations is more 
unstable and shows a slight decrease in the last decades.  
Lastly, Fig. 9 depicts the evolution of the average percentage of Supplementary, Acknowledgement, and 
Documental citations. The only type showing a clear trend is the percentage of Supplementary 
citations, which reaches its maximum peak in the last decade. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009
MEAN MEDIAN
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009
MEAN MEDIAN
17 
 
 
Fig. 9 Percentage of Supplementary, Acknowledgment and Documental citations (Mean over time) 
4 DISCUSSION 
The first clear pattern in the data is the quasi-exponential growth in the average number of references 
per paper (Fig.1). This suggests an evolution in the citation behavior of analytic philosophers, who 
clearly started using more explicit references to the literature, especially in the last two decades. The 
interplay of three different factors may explain this pattern. Firstly, it is possible that editorial policies of 
AP journals changed in the last decades, encouraging authors to state explicit citations, rather than 
referring to implicit references.  This may be in turn a consequence of the rise of the “citation culture” 
described by Wouters (1999). Secondly, it is possible that the emergence of the Internet has 
considerably simplified the literature search for analytic philosophers, in the same way as it helped 
scientists (Ucar et al. 2014). Indeed, there exist two databases dedicated to philosophical literature (The 
Philosopher’s Index and the more recent PhilPapers) which are widely used by analytic philosophers for 
their literature searching.  Thirdly, the exponential pattern may be explained by the growth of the 
disciplinary literature of AP, and as a sign of an accumulation process taking place.  
Therefore, the first clear pattern in the data suggests that the answer to our research question (has AP 
started to accumulate during the second half of the twentieth century?) may be positive. However, the 
citations must be further analyzed to provide a clear answer to this research question, as their type and 
epistemological function should be taken into account.  
The State of the Art category is particularly relevant to investigate the phenomenon of knowledge 
accumulation. The presence of this type of citations points out that the author of the citing paper 
regards her own work as contributing to an existing disciplinary body, to an on-going debate. State of 
the art citations are evidences of a collective work taking place, and the sign that a stock of knowledge 
is accumulating. Therefore, the increased percentage of this type of citations in the last 60 years (Fig. 5 
and 8), and their widespread use in the 2000s, corroborates the idea that AP effectively underwent a 
process of accumulation. In addition to this, it is important to notice that in the 1990s and 2000s, we do 
not find any paper lacking this type of citations. In the 2000s, AP seems to have reached a mature stage 
of development, with an established literature shaping the intellectual production. This result is in 
accordance with evidence coming from co-citation analysis of AP. Buonomo and Petrovich (2018) 
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report that after the turn of the century AP appears to be clearly divided into a set of sub-disciplines 
with relatively defined borders.  
The decreasing trend in the percentage of Critical citations (Fig. 4 and 7, Fig. 2 even shows a decrease 
in the absolute number of Critical citations in the last decade) sheds light on another aspect of the 
normalization process, namely the decreasing weight of disagreement within the AP community. 17 This 
is also in line with Kuhn’s theory of normal science and the low rate of negative citations found in the 
sciences (Catalini et al. 2015, Bertin et al. 2016, Cano 1989).  
However, the changing trend in the percentage of Supporting citations, and their almost linear decrease 
in the last three decades (Fig. 3 and 6), implies that we have to be wary of a straightforward assimilation 
of AP to a classic Kuhnian normal science. It is important to remember that these citations are the only 
ones whose epistemological function is openly constructive, and the only ones stating an explicit consensus 
between the citing and the cited documents. State of the art citations, on the contrary, are cited without 
an open endorsement of the cited document. From an epistemological point of view, they are cited 
“neutrally” by the citing author. Their function is to build a background for the contribution, not to 
support some specific claim18, so that they cannot be directly interpreted as fully positive citations. In 
AP, it is possible for an author to firstly cite several documents in order to review the topic’s state of 
the art, and then to dismiss all their claims.  
Given the lack of a well-defined increasing pattern in the occurrence of Supporting citations, the 
statement that AP is a Kuhnian Normal science must be honed. From the data, we can infer that AP is 
a specialty that has been consolidated in the last decades, without at the same time converging towards 
consensus. This apparently contradictory situation (accumulation without consensus) can be explained 
by the following hypothesis: AP underwent a process of fragmentation into several sub-disciplines, 
especially from the 1990s onwards. Under this hypothesis, the State of the art citations have the 
primary function of identifying the sub-disciplinary area to which the paper is meant to contribute. Once the 
sub-area is identified, analytic philosophers debate inside it in the classical philosophical fashion, i.e. 
citing both positively and negatively other documents. Within each sub-area, the consensus is lacking, 
as the decrease in the proportion of Supporting citations from the 1980s may indicate. However, the 
papers to contrast in order to advance a debate is clearly defined. Each sub-area has its own state-of-
the-art. If this hypothesis was correct, the fragmentation process of AP would have begun in the 1980s, 
the decade in which the percentages of Supporting and State of the Art citations started following 
opposite trends (the first decreasing, the second increasing). This is not very far from traditional 
historical accounts of recent AP, which set in the middle 1970s the beginning of the fragmentation of 
the field (Tripodi 2015 : ch.4).  
A kind of consensus emerges at the level of AP as a whole. Here there is a consensus about the 
background structure of the field. The accumulation process of AP therefore concerns the progressive 
stabilization of a sub-disciplinary organization, i.e. the increasing division of the epistemic labor into a 
set of specific sub-areas. This hypothesis provides a possible explanation for the patterns in the three 
most common types of citation.19 
                                                          
17 The overall proportion of Critical citations (Tab. 2) is higher than the result reported by Cullars in his study of philosophy 
monographs, where 11.1% of citations were classified as critical (Cullars 1998 : 62). This is probably due to the fact that 
papers are more narrow-focused than books, and therefore devote more space to criticism and argumentation. 
18 Unless very loosely, by showing that the author is legitimated to contribute to the debate because she is up-to-date. 
19 As a Reviewer suggested, another hypothesis can be advanced to explain these results, namely that the fragmentation of 
the field is simply the consequence of the massive amount of information analytic philosophers have to confront with. As 
Quinn (1987) says: «Having limited time and energy at their disposal, individual philosophers have to focus rather narrowly 
to keep up with rapid developments in their areas of specialization» (111). A similar idea can be found in Marconi (2014) 
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The increasing trend in the percentage of Perfunctory citations (Fig. 9), especially in the last decade, 
may be a consequence of the general increase in the average number of references per paper. It could 
be argued that the longer the reference list, the higher is the probability that some of the cited works 
are not strictly relevant to the citing author’s immediate concerns. With regard to the overall proportion 
of Perfunctory citations (Tab.2), this can be compared with results from other studies. Bornmann and 
Daniel (2008) report that the proportion of citations classified as “perfunctory” in previous studies 
ranged from about 10% to 50%. In the current study, Perfunctory citations reached an average of 10% 
only in the last decade. The overall low proportion may be due to the discursive nature of AP: analytic 
philosophers’ research practice is based on a continuous debate with peers. Citations are mainly used as 
“moves in the epistemic game” (to locate in a specific stream of discussion – State of the Art citations –
, to attack or defend a position – respectively Critical and Supporting citations). Using a Perfunctory 
citation in a paper is like doing a move without any effect, and this may be the reason why analytic 
philosophers are inclined to avoid this type of citations. 20  
Perhaps, the patterns in the last two categories are easier to explain. Acknowledgement citations were 
never a significative proportion of the sample (Tab. 2), and the decrease in their percentage is probably 
due to the simultaneous establishment of manuscript’ sections specifically dedicated to 
acknowledgements (Cronin et al. 2003). Lastly, the low proportion of Documental citation (Tab. 2) is 
coherent with the theoretical focus of AP, whose main interest lies in philosophical theorizing rather 
than in historical reconstruction of past philosophers’ thought.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, qualitative citation context analysis was used to shed light on an epistemological question: 
how does knowledge accumulate in para-scientific areas? Analytic Philosophy was selected as an 
interesting example of para-science, and Kuhnian theory of normal science was chosen as a theoretical 
framework. The main result of the analysis is that knowledge in AP indeed started to accumulate but in 
a peculiar manner. Accumulation was not matched by a rising consensus within the AP community. 
This can be explained by the hypothesis that AP has undergone a process of fragmentation in sub-
fields. In each sub-field, the discussion is characterized by high dialectics and low consensus rates that 
are typical of philosophical debates. However, a consensus arises at the level of the overall field, and it 
concerns the division of cognitive labor in AP, i.e. about the presence of specific sub-disciplinary 
literatures. Hence, it may be said that a sort of “soft paradigm” has taken over. 21 
In general, the results seem to confirm the claim, recently put forth by historians of philosophy, that 
AP underwent a process of normalization (i.e. assimilation to a Kuhnian normal science model) in the 
last decades. Citation context analysis allowed not only to empirically test this assertion, but also to 
study in detail patterns and specific features of the normalization process, proving to be a valuable tool 
for epistemological inquiries. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
and Schwartz (1995), both linking the trend towards specialization to the growth of the literature available in AP. This 
hypothesis is worth considering because it brings into the picture an important factor influencing the citing behavior (i.e. the 
increase of the available literature). However, we believe this is not in contrast with the hypothesis advanced in this study 
(i.e. the normalization of AP in the form of the progressive delineation of a background structure of the field): 
normalization and specialization could be indeed two mutually reinforcing factors shaping contemporary AP. This interpretation 
is also consistent with Kuhn’s late theory of science (see Kuhn 2000, where the philosophers explicitly linked specialization  
and normal science; see also Brad Wray 2011). A possible way to check the weight of the different factors could be, as a 
Reviewer suggested, to classify the contexts citing the 60 articles under consideration, and see if the proportions of 
categories change over time and across different sub-fields. We leave this for a future work. 
20  However, it is also possible that the understanding of “perfunctory/supplementary” citations used in this study is 
different from the one employed in previous ones. 
21 I thank an anonymous Reviewer for the expression “soft paradigm”. 
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However, this study focused on the similarities between AP and Normal science at the level of research 
practices, as far as they can be captured by citation context analysis. Differences of conceptual status 
between the two fields – albeit clearly existing – were explicitly left outside the study. An important 
challenge for the future work is the integration of the conceptual dimension into studies of knowledge 
accumulation processes. This integration will allow the assessment of how conceptual differences 
between AP and science shape their accumulation patterns. Such study would require an even closer 
integration between philosophy of science and scientometrics than the one attempted in this paper. 22 
Further research is needed to connect the epistemological stance taken in this research (which focused 
on the accumulation of knowledge) to sociologically oriented theories of citations (which focus on 
practices of epistemic communities). Understanding which one of the most renowned citation theories 
better takes into account the accumulation process in para-scientific areas is certainly worth further 
investigation. Importantly, it would also clarify the validity of citation-based assessments of research 
performance in the context of para-scientific research.  
 
 
  
                                                          
22 I thank an anonymous Reviewer for this suggestion.  
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7 APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE METADATA 
# Author PY Title Source Vol Is First 
Page 
End 
Page 
1950-1959 
1 GRICE, HP 1957 MEANING Philos. 
Rev. 
66 3 377 388 
2 VENDLER, Z 1957 VERBS AND TIMES Philos. 
Rev. 
66 2 143 160 
3 SMART, JJC 1959 SENSATIONS AND 
BRAIN PROCESSES 
Philos. 
Rev. 
68 2 141 156 
4 RAWLS, J 1958 JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS Philos. 
Rev. 
67 2 164 194 
5 QUINE, WV 1956 QUANTIFIERS AND 
PROPOSITIONAL 
ATTITUDES 
J. 
Philos. 
53 5 177 187 
6 SEARLE, JR 1958 PROPER NAMES Mind 67 2
6
6 
166 173 
7 FREGE, G 1956 THE THOUGHT - A 
LOGICAL INQUIRY 
Mind 65 2
5
9 
289 311 
8 SIBLEY, F 1959 AESTHETIC CONCEPTS Philos. 
Rev. 
68 4 421 450 
9 GRICE, HP; 
STRAWSON, 
PF 
1956 IN DEFENSE OF A 
DOGMA 
Philos. 
Rev. 
65 2 141 158 
1
0 
DUMMETT, 
M 
1959 WITTGENSTEIN 
PHILOSOPHY OF 
MATHEMATICS 
Philos. 
Rev. 
68 3 324 348 
1960-1969 
1 DONNELLA
N, KS 
1966 REFERENCE AND 
DEFINITE 
DESCRIPTIONS 
Philos. 
Rev. 
75 3 281 304 
2 DAVIDSON, 
D 
1963 ACTIONS, REASONS, 
AND CAUSES - 
SYMPOSIUM 
J. 
Philos. 
60 2
3 
685 700 
3 FRANKFURT
, HG 
1969 ALTERNATE 
POSSIBILITIES AND 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
J. 
Philos. 
66 2
3 
829 839 
4 HARMAN, 
GH 
1965 THE INFERENCE TO 
THE BEST 
EXPLANATION 
Philos. 
Rev. 
74 1 88 95 
5 GRICE, HP 1969 UTTERERS MEANING 
AND INTENTIONS 
Philos. 
Rev. 
78 2 147 177 
6 LEWIS, DK 1968 COUNTERPART THEORY 
AND QUANTIFIED 
MODAL LOGIC 
J. 
Philos. 
65 5 113 126 
7 DANTO, A 1964 THE ARTWORLD J. 
Philos. 
61 1
9 
571 584 
8 BENACERRA 1965 WHAT NUMBERS COULD Philos. 74 1 47 73 
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F, P NOT BE Rev. 
9 STRAWSON, 
PF 
1964 INTENTION AND 
CONVENTION IN 
SPEECH ACTS 
Philos. 
Rev. 
73 4 439 460 
1
0 
GEACH, PT 1965 ASSERTION Philos. 
Rev. 
74 4 449 465 
1970-1979 
1 NAGEL, T 1974 WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE 
A BAT 
Philos. 
Rev. 
83 4 435 450 
2 KRIPKE, S 1975 OUTLINE OF A THEORY 
OF TRUTH 
J. 
Philos. 
72 1
9 
690 716 
3 PERRY, J 1979 PROBLEM OF THE 
ESSENTIAL INDEXICAL 
Nous 13 1 3 21 
4 CUMMINS, R 1975 FUNCTIONAL-ANALYSIS J. 
Philos. 
72 2
0 
741 765 
5 LEWIS, D 1979 ATTITUDES DE-DICTO 
AND DE-SE 
Philos. 
Rev. 
88 4 513 543 
6 GOLDMAN, 
AI 
1976 DISCRIMINATION AND 
PERCEPTUAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
J. 
Philos. 
73 2
0 
771 791 
7 LEWIS, D 1979 COUNTERFACTUAL 
DEPENDENCE AND 
TIMES ARROW 
Nous 13 4 455 476 
8 DRETSKE, FI 1970 EPISTEMIC OPERATORS J. 
Philos. 
67 2
4 
1007 1023 
9 LEWIS, D 1976 PROBABILITIES OF 
CONDITIONALS AND 
CONDITIONAL 
PROBABILITIES 
Philos. 
Rev. 
85 3 297 315 
1
0 
WRIGHT, L 1973 FUNCTIONS Philos. 
Rev. 
82 2 139 168 
1980-1989 
1 CHURCHLA
ND, PM 
1981 ELIMINATIVE 
MATERIALISM AND THE 
PROPOSITIONAL 
ATTITUDES 
J. 
Philos. 
78 2 67 90 
2 RAWLS, J 1980 RATIONAL AND FULL 
AUTONOMY 
J. 
Philos. 
77 9 515 535 
3 JACKSON, F 1986 WHAT MARY DIDNT 
KNOW + KNOWLEDGE 
ARGUMENT AGAINST 
PHYSICALISM 
J. 
Philos. 
83 5 291 295 
4 RAILTON, P 1986 MORAL REALISM + A 
FORM OF ETHICAL 
NATURALISM 
Philos. 
Rev. 
95 2 163 207 
5 WOLF, S 1982 MORAL SAINTS + 
IMPLICATIONS FOR 
MORAL-PHILOSOPHY 
J. 
Philos. 
79 8 419 439 
6 BURGE, T 1986 INDIVIDUALISM AND 
PSYCHOLOGY 
Philos. 
Rev. 
95 1 3 45 
7 KIM, J 1984 CONCEPTS OF Philos. 45 2 153 176 
26 
 
SUPERVENIENCE Pheno
menol. 
Res. 
8 BURGE, T 1988 INDIVIDUALISM AND 
SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
J. 
Philos. 
85 1
1 
649 663 
9 MCGINN, C 1989 CAN WE SOLVE THE 
MIND BODY PROBLEM 
Mind 98 3
9
1 
349 366 
1
0 
BOGEN, J; 
WOODWAR
D, J 
1988 SAVING THE 
PHENOMENA 
Philos. 
Rev. 
97 3 303 352 
1990-1999 
1 DEROSE, K 1995 SOLVING THE 
SKEPTICAL PROBLEM 
Philos. 
Rev. 
104 1 1 52 
2 BRATMAN, 
ME 
1992 SHARED COOPERATIVE 
ACTIVITY 
Philos. 
Rev. 
101 2 327 340 
3 BURGE, T 1993 CONTENT 
PRESERVATION 
Philos. 
Rev. 
102 4 457 488 
4 YABLO, S 1992 MENTAL CAUSATION Philos. 
Rev. 
101 2 245 280 
5 DENNETT, 
DC 
1991 REAL PATTERNS J. 
Philos. 
88 1 27 51 
6 EDGINGTO
N, D 
1995 ON CONDITIONALS Mind 104 4
1
4 
235 329 
7 DAVIDSON, 
D 
1990 THE STRUCTURE AND 
CONTENT OF TRUTH 
J. 
Philos. 
87 6 279 328 
8 LEWIS, D 1994 CHANCE AND 
CREDENCE - HUMEAN 
SUPERVENIENCE 
DEBUGGED 
Mind 103 4
1
2 
473 490 
9 DEROSE, K 1992 CONTEXTUALISM AND 
KNOWLEDGE 
ATTRIBUTIONS 
Philos. 
Pheno
menol. 
Res. 
52 4 913 929 
1
0 
GRIFFITHS, 
PE; GRAY, 
RD 
1994 DEVELOPMENTAL 
SYSTEMS AND 
EVOLUTIONARY 
EXPLANATION 
J. 
Philos. 
91 6 277 304 
2000-2009 
1 Pryor, J 2000 The skeptic and the dogmatist Nous 34 4 517 549 
2 Stanley, J; 
Williamson, T 
2001 Knowing how J. 
Philos. 
98 8 411 444 
3 Lewis, D 2000 Causation as influence J. 
Philos. 
97 4 182 197 
4 Kolodny, N 2005 Why be rational? Mind 114 4
5
5 
509 563 
5 Elga, A 2007 Reflection and disagreement Nous 41 3 478 502 
6 Nichols, S; 
Knobe, J 
2007 Moral responsibility and 
determinism: The cognitive 
Nous 41 4 663 685 
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science of folk intuitions 
7 Chalmers, DJ; 
Jackson, F 
2001 Conceptual analysis and 
reductive explanation 
Philos. 
Rev. 
110 3 315 360 
8 Rupert, RD 2004 Challenges to the hypothesis 
of extended cognition 
J. 
Philos. 
101 8 389 428 
9 Christensen, D 2007 Epistemology of 
Disagreement: The Good 
News 
Philos. 
Rev. 
116 2 187 217 
1
0 
Byrne, A 2001 Intentionalism defended Philos. 
Rev. 
110 2 199 240 
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8 APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLES OF CATEGORIES OF CITATION 
In this Appendix, examples of categories of citations (see Tab.1) are reported. However, one should 
keep in mind that generally it is necessary to consider the whole content of the paper in order to classify 
plausibly the function of the citations. Very often, in the case of AP the “context” of the citation turns 
out to be the entire paper. 
State of the art citations: 
“Almost all the extensive recent literature seeking alternatives to the orthodox approach – I 
would mention especially the writings of Bas an Fraassen and Robert L. Martin – agrees on a 
single basic idea…” [Kripke 1975 : 698] 
“For the classic discussion of these problems, see [12]” [Perry 1979 : 21] 
“A survey of the recent philosophical literature on the nature of functional analysis and 
explanation, beginning with the classic essays of Hempel in 1959 and Nagel in 1961, reveals 
that… [note]” [Cummins 1975 : 741] 
“Some philosophers have claimed that people have incompatibilist intuitions (e.g. Kane 1999, 
218; Strawson 1986, 30; Vargas 2006); others have challenged this claim and suggested that 
people’s intuitions actually fit with compatibilism (Nahmias et al. 2015)” [Nichols and Knobe 
2007 : 663] 
Supporting citations: 
“I follow Arthur Smullyan’s treatment of scope ambiguity in modal sentences, given in 
‘Modality and Description’, Journal of Symbolic Logic, XIII, 1 (March 1948): 31-37, as qualified by 
Wilson’s objection, in The Concept of Language…” [Lewis 1968 : 120] 
 “The influence of H. P. Grice’s ‘Meaning’, The Philosophical Review, LXVI (1957): 377-388 will be 
evident here” [Davidson 1992 : 311] 
Supplementary citations: 
“For my former view, see the treatment of preemption in ‘Postscript E to ‘Causation’’, in my 
Philosophical Papers, Volume II (New York: Oxford, 1986), pp. 193-212.” [Lewis 2000 : 1983, in 
footnote]  
Acknowledgement citations: 
“In thinking about the problem of essential indexical, I have been greatly helped by the writings 
of Hector-Neri Castaneda on indexicality and related topics. Castaneda focused attention on 
these problems, and made many of the points made here, in [1], [2] and [3]” [Perry 1979 : 21] 
Critical citations: 
“The difficulty one gets into by a mechanical application of the  theory of games to moral 
philosophy can be brought out by considering among several possible examples, R. B. 
Braithwaite’s study, Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher (Cambridge 1955) […] 
Braithwaite’s use of the theory of games, insofar as it  is intended to analyze the concept of 
fairness, is, I think, mistaken” [Rawls 1958 : 176-177] 
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“W. V. Quine, for one, explicitly denies that anything need to be done other than provide a 
progression to serve as the numbers. In Word and Object (London, 1960, pp. 262-263, he states 
[…] I would disagree” [Benacerraf 1965 : 51] 
Documental citations: 
“While the assimilation is implicit in Bentham’s and Sidgwick’s moral theory, explicit statements 
of it as applied to justice are relatively rare. One clear instance in The Principles of Morals and 
Legislation occurs in ch. X, footnote 2 to section XL: […]” [Rawls 1958 : 184] 
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9 APPENDIX 3: RAW DATA 
In the following Table, percentage of citation categories, divided by paper and decade, are reported. 
Papers’ profiles are available on-line in Petrovich (2008).  
Supporting citations 
# Paper 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
1 0.00% 8.33% 42.31% 52.94% 18.84% 21.01% 
2 66.67% 5.56% 54.55% 20.00% 31.37% 31.25% 
3 87.50% 0.00% 30.77% 42.86% 46.00% 61.54% 
4 32.29% 100.00% 33.33% 52.38% 36.05% 22.62% 
5 100.00% 50.00% 39.13% 0.00% 56.25% 32.86% 
6 50.00% 38.64% 28.13% 66.67% 14.22% 21.74% 
7 0.00% 0.00% 42.86% 24.19% 35.96% 25.00% 
8 35.71% 30.00% 100.00% 61.54% 50.00% 40.74% 
9 0.00% 50.00% 55.00% 87.50% 13.16% 66.67% 
10 0.00% 8.33% 27.27% 35.23% 60.00% 26.86% 
MEAN 37.22% 29.09% 45.33% 44.33% 36.19% 35.03% 
MEDIAN 34.00% 19.17% 40.72% 47.62% 36.01% 29.06% 
MAX 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 87.50% 60.00% 66.67% 
MIN 0.00% 0.00% 27.27% 0.00% 13.16% 21.01% 
Critical citations 
# Paper 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
1 100.00% 50.00% 38.46% 47.06% 23.91% 2.17% 
2 16.67% 94.44% 18.18% 26.67% 7.84% 25.00% 
3 8.33% 0.00% 7.69% 57.14% 20.67% 0.00% 
4 15.63% 0.00% 26.67% 14.29% 0.00% 26.19% 
5 0.00% 50.00% 8.70% 7.14% 16.67% 0.00% 
6 25.00% 0.00% 40.63% 22.22% 5.60% 0.00% 
7 0.00% 0.00% 33.33% 6.45% 22.81% 21.15% 
8 28.57% 30.00% 0.00% 23.08% 38.24% 9.26% 
9 100.00% 25.00% 40.00% 0.00% 10.53% 9.52% 
10 12.50% 91.67% 36.36% 22.35% 13.33% 10.36% 
MEAN 30.67% 34.11% 25.00% 22.64% 15.96% 10.37% 
MEDIAN 16.15% 27.50% 30.00% 22.29% 15.00% 9.39% 
MAX 100.00% 94.44% 40.63% 57.14% 38.24% 26.19% 
MIN 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
State of the art citations 
# Paper 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
1 0.00% 8.33% 0.00% 0.00% 42.75% 63.04% 
2 0.00% 0.00% 18.18% 9.17% 54.90% 21.88% 
3 4.17% 0.00% 23.08% 0.00% 22.67% 23.08% 
4 18.75% 0.00% 40.00% 0.00% 54.65% 39.29% 
5 0.00% 0.00% 36.96% 64.29% 12.50% 44.29% 
6 25.00% 31.82% 25.00% 13.89% 58.19% 56.52% 
7 0.00% 0.00% 19.05% 53.23% 14.91% 42.31% 
8 35.71% 0.00% 0.00% 23.08% 2.94% 34.26% 
9 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 12.50% 68.42% 23.81% 
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10 50.00% 0.00% 36.36% 17.80% 23.33% 53.56% 
MEAN 13.36% 4.02% 19.86% 19.40% 35.53% 40.20% 
MEDIAN 2.09% 0.00% 21.06% 13.20% 33.04% 40.80% 
MAX 50.00% 31.82% 40.00% 64.29% 68.42% 63.04% 
MIN 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.94% 21.88% 
Supplementary/Perfunctory citations 
# Paper 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
1 0.00% 16.67% 11.54% 0.00% 8.70% 9.42% 
2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 0.00% 12.50% 
3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.00% 15.38% 
4 18.75% 0.00% 0.00% 4.76% 4.65% 7.14% 
5 0.00% 0.00% 4.35% 14.29% 4.17% 14.29% 
6 0.00% 9.09% 6.25% 5.56% 3.88% 15.22% 
7 0.00% 0.00% 4.76% 0.00% 7.02% 11.54% 
8 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.69% 5.88% 9.26% 
9 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
10 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.08% 2.22% 5.34% 
MEAN 1.88% 2.58% 2.69% 7.24% 4.05% 10.01% 
MEDIAN 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.16% 4.08% 10.48% 
MAX 18.75% 16.67% 11.54% 20.08% 8.70% 15.38% 
MIN 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Acknowledgment citations 
# Paper 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.80% 0.00% 
2 16.67% 0.00% 9.09% 5.00% 5.88% 0.00% 
3 0.00% 0.00% 38.46% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
4 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 19.05% 0.00% 0.00% 
5 0.00% 0.00% 6.52% 7.14% 8.33% 8.57% 
6 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.56% 3.45% 0.00% 
7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.84% 0.00% 0.00% 
8 0.00% 40.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.94% 0.00% 
9 0.00% 0.00% 5.00% 0.00% 7.89% 0.00% 
10 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.11% 0.00% 
MEAN 1.67% 4.00% 5.91% 4.16% 3.54% 0.86% 
MEDIAN 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.42% 3.19% 0.00% 
MAX 16.67% 40.00% 38.46% 19.05% 8.33% 8.57% 
MIN 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Documental citations 
# Paper 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
1 0.00% 16.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 19.17% 0.00% 6.25% 
3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6.67% 0.00% 
4 14.58% 0.00% 0.00% 9.52% 4.65% 0.00% 
5 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.14% 2.08% 0.00% 
6 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.59% 0.00% 
7 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 11.29% 19.30% 0.00% 
8 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.69% 0.00% 6.48% 
32 
 
9 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
10 37.50% 0.00% 0.00% 4.55% 0.00% 0.00% 
MEAN 5.21% 4.17% 0.00% 5.94% 3.53% 1.27% 
MEDIAN 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.84% 1.04% 0.00% 
MAX 37.50% 25.00% 0.00% 19.17% 19.30% 6.48% 
MIN 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
 
